Possible understanding between Riyadh and Washington on the Sudan war – the face of truth – ✍️ Ibrahim Shaqlawi
With the growing complexities of the Sudanese scene and the intersection of regional and international interests, a pivotal question arises whether the will of Riyadh and Washington really respects a regulation which gives justice to the Sudanese people, or the dinner platform is still a formal framework for the freezing of the crisis and does it not overcome it? The follow -up of the political signals and the discourse of the leaders, in particular of what was stated in the speech of the Saudi Crown Prince during the American summit of the Gulf, opens a window to understand the nature of the current understanding, and if they express a transformation of the vision or simply a reproduction of old containment tools. In this article, we try to read this scene in the light of these indicators.
It is clear that Washington recently adopted the approval of authorization in complex regional files, including the Sudanese file, which is part of the main balance of the Red Sea. Consequently, Saudi Arabia emerges, through the “Jeddah forum”, as a major actor in order to control this dossier, who was confirmed by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman during his speech, when he underlined the kingdom’s commitment to reaching a complete cease-fire in Sudan in cooperation with Washington. This “complete” sentence – in my appreciation – is new to stop there.
These declarations can go beyond the idea of mediation to the reformulation of a new regional engineering which begins from the Red Sea and does not end in Khartoum. He also goes beyond the Chair of Jeddah to the implicit statement that Sudan is no longer a marginal problem in regional security accounts. On the contrary, Khartoum today represents a point of intersection between the interests of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar and even of the United States itself, in the light of the expansion of the militia, the threat of the ways of navigation and the climbing of non-traditional active influences on the Sudanese scene.
On the American side, clear change features appear in strategic belief. Washington is no longer obsessed with direct file control, but rather preferred the unequal, delegating and coordinating partnership, with strong regional allies. Perhaps the repeated meetings between Riyadh and Washington in Sudan represent one of the characteristics of this change. The emerging understanding between the two parties reflect Washington’s desire to contain the Sudanese conflict without direct involvement, by delegating the “Jeddah platform”, which was to put pressure on the militia and its supporters to implement the agreement. However, observers see the lack of pressure caused by the search for a regulation that certain parties see, that the Sudanese government and the army reject.
However, this path is not without contradictions, in particular with the controversial role according to which parties such as water play to support the militia, according to international relations, which constitutes additional pressure on Riyadic for re-engineer regional programming, in a way which guarantees a balance which does not integrate with its interest on the sea and does not threaten its title in security or its regional influence, after its country, Regional influence, after his country, and does not threaten security in Yenou investment in peace and security, in accordance with new American policies in the region.
In the depth of this scene, the Sudan war has become an arena for the regional wills conflict, and perhaps an area to liquidate strategic accounts. The use of drones in Sudanese movements of the East, Egyptian, Saudi Arabia and Qatari is all indications that Sudan has become a red line in Arab security equations.
It is clear – and according to these data – that Riyadh is considered to destabilize Sudan in Sudan, will reflect directly on the security of the Red Sea and is raped with sales. As for Cairo, he believes that the collapse of the Sudanese state means an existential threat to its national security. While Doha moves in the background of the scene as a peacemaker through his experience in the peace of Darfur, via the Doha platform, which was crowned with the signing of the Doha document on July 14, 2011, it is therefore an acceptable mediator for several festivals.
On the other hand, recent developments in the region indicate transformations of traditional alliances. The visit of American president Donald Trump in the region and his new trends in the treatment of the Middle East issues reflect an attempt to reshape the regional system in proportion to the interests of the United States at the current stadium.
In this context, the importance of coordination between Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt, is underlined by formulating a common position towards the Sudanese crisis. These countries realize that Sudan’s stability is an integral part of the security of the region. Sudan is no longer a detail in a overlapping regional scene. Rather, it has become the essence of the new balance, either to be restored by a complete colony, similar to the understanding that took place in Syria, which guarantees its sovereignty, its national security and the unity of its land, or that it turns to alternative options with other partners to achieve it.
Consequently, the understanding between Riyadh and Washington on Sudan cannot be separated from the wider struggle for influence, nor from the reconstruction of Arabic collective security. Whenever the end of the war approaches, the important question approaches: who will be the partner of Sudan in the post-war? Who will be maximized from the equation? The regional scene shows that Sudan is no longer just an internal struggle, but rather an active element in the reshaping of regional and international sales.
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