The participation of the Sudanese transitional sovereignty council, Abdel -Fattah al -burhan and Prime Minister Kamel Idris during meetings of the United Nations General Assembly -Dimensions, Connotations and Vision Future ✍️ Abu al -tayeb Adam Hassan Suleiman

The participation of the Sudanese transitional sovereign council, Abdel Fattah Al -Burhan, and Prime Minister Kamel Idris in meetings of the United Nations General Assembly – Dimensions, Connotations and Future Vision

First: the general context

Since the war between the army and rapid support in April 2023, Sudan has attended one of its most complex political and humanitarian crises. With the appointment of Dr. Kamel Idris – the former United Nations official – as Prime Minister in May 2025 by a decision of the first team, Abdel Fattah Al -Burhan, president of the Council of Transitional Sovereignty, new hopes have emerged in the possibility of building an internal political consensus and a re -opens to the international community.

The United Nations General Assembly, which generally holds its high-level week in September and extends some of its activities to October, is a basic platform to present state problems in the world and is used as an opportunity to intensify bilateral meetings with world leaders and decision-makers.

Second: political indications for joint participation

1. Show the leadership unit: joint participation between evidence and Idris represents a sign of overcoming the state of division between sovereign and executive, and ensuring a coherent image before the international community.

2. The reintegration of Sudan internationally: this stage seeks to restore Sudan on the international scene after years of marginalization and sanctions, in particular in the light of the international role in human and political mediation.

3. A Sudanese interior message: the target visit not only outside, but rather sends an internal message that the government seeks to carry out political penetration through international channels, which can strengthen popular trust during the transition.

Third: the expected objectives of the visit

1. Mobilization of humanitarian and economic support: Sudan faces a humanitarian disaster and suffocating economic difficulties, and the Sudanese delegation is expected to demand an increase in international aid and promises of reconstruction.

2. Payment of the Pay of Peace: Idris announced in previous statements her commitment to a complete dialogue with all Sudanese parties, and he could use this platform to confirm the government’s intention to achieve political regulations.

3. Building trusted bridges with influential capitals: bilateral meetings with Washington, Brussels and Doha is likely, especially since Idris has an international training which gives it wide acceptance in diplomatic circles.

4. Require the lifting of sanctions and eliminate restrictions: by investing meetings with international partners, Sudan can seek concrete stages in the abolition of obstacles to investment and trade.

Fourth: future vision

1. Fixing the political transition: The success of the visit can open the door to new provisions for the transition and improve access to the elections or to a full political agreement.

2. Move the donor path: if the delegation succeeds in marketing a clear vision, conferences of donors can be held to support the reconstruction of Sudan similar to what happened in countries outside the conflicts.

3. Promote the regional role: Sudan seeks to prove that it is capable of playing an active regional role, and that it is not only an objective of conflict that threatens stability in the horn of Africa.

4. The balance between internal legitimacy and external support: participation represents an opportunity to lay the foundations for a new internal social contract supported by international guarantees.

Fifth: risks and challenges

1. The discourse between evidence and the Idris: if the differences appear in situations, this can give a negative impression and weaken the unified message.

2. International lack of confidence: Some powers still examine the transitional authority in Sudan, which can limit the size of the response.

3. War power pressure: rapid support and others can hinder any political or promise made by the delegation in New York.

Sixth: Practical recommendations

1. The unification of political discourse: formulate a common vision between evidence and the Idris presented at the General Assembly and highlights the harmony of leadership, while avoiding any contradiction in declarations.

2. Prepare a complete file on the crisis: submit specific relationships to the international community showing the size of the humanitarian and economic disaster, supported by statistics, maps and urgent needs.

3. A national peace plan: announcing a clear roadmap which includes a complete dialogue, and guarantees a cease-fire, with the involvement of the United Nations and the African Union as a guy.

4. An integrated economic program: presenting a specific economic reform plan, which increases the chances of accessing the support of donors and investment.

5. Investing bilateral relations: plan bilateral meetings with influential countries (United States, the European Union, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others) to guarantee practical obligations instead of simply supporting data.

6. Concentrate on the regional dimension: persuade the African and Arab district that Sudan’s stability is used for their security, to obtain additional political and diplomatic support.

7. Communication with Sudanese communities abroad: invest in New York to meet community representatives and obtain their support as a gentle pressure on Western public opinion.

conclusion

The success of the Sudanese delegation in the transformation of participation in the meetings of the United Nations General Assembly to simply attend a protocol to a strategic platform to mobilize international support, and to show a commitment to democratic transformation and peace, will improve the position of Sudan on an international scale and are preparing to reconstruct internal and external confidence. The biggest challenge remains in the ability of leadership to provide a unified, realistic and convincing vision of the world.







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