Farewell to the Rapid Support Forces and its political incubator due to the strategic errors which directly accelerated the failure of its project in Sudan ✍️ Abu Al-Tayeb Adam Hassan Suleiman
The Rapid Support Forces had significant and decisive advantages in the current war in Sudan (2023-2025).
= Highly trained ground strike force.
= Highly centralized management structure.
= Support unlimited financial and political resources that varied between internal countries, neighboring countries, the region and the world. Despite all these advantages, he made a series of strategic and tactical errors that contributed greatly to failing to achieve his goals, whether it was total control of the government, the acquisition of political legitimacy, or the defeat of the Sudanese armed forces. Here are the most notable errors with some analysis:
✅ 1. A poor estimate of the strength of the Sudanese army, its preparations and its leadership
Mistake: The Rapid Support Forces thought they could quickly resolve the battle against the Sudanese army in just 24 hours, relying on the element of surprise, surprise and numerical superiority in urban areas (like Khartoum, the capital).
Result: The war lasted a long time and the army was able to reorganize its ranks and regain control of large areas, notably in eastern, northern, central and western Sudan, with the help of the air force and popular support.
✅ 2. Excessive use of control within cities without a popular incubator
Error: Rapid Support Forces focused on controlling the capital (Khartoum) and other strategic civilian areas without securing rural depth or gaining popular support.
Result: cities turned into devastating battlefields and the overwhelming majority of Sudanese public opinion turned against RSF due to destruction, looting and systematic violations.
✅ 3. Committing widespread violations against civilians
Error: Major violations were recorded against the Rapid Support Forces, particularly in Darfur, Khartoum and Al-Jazeera, including:
Killing and raping civilians.
Forced displacement and looting of homes and stores.
Using civilians as human shields.
As a result, these violations have weakened its legitimacy at home and abroad, and led to international condemnation and potential steps to prosecute its leaders for war crimes.
✅ 4. The absence of a post-war political vision
Error: The Rapid Support Forces did not present a clear plan to govern Sudan or manage the state after the so-called victory.
As a result, it failed to gain political support from actual civilian forces and continued to be seen as an undisciplined military force seeking only power, which deepened its isolation. Therefore, military victory was seen as equivalent to seizing political power, but the lack of an alternative plan on how to run the state after military control made Rapid Support’s military victory politically useless.
✅ 5. Rapid and inconsiderate land expansion
Mistake: Rapid support expanded to new areas (such as North Kordofan, West Darfur, etc.) without securing supply lines or an effective logistics structure.
As a result, he failed to preserve many of the areas he entered and suffered significant human and material losses as a result of the army’s counterattacks.
✅ 6. The use of mercenaries and external support aroused suspicion
Error: Rapid Support used fighters from other African countries (Chad, Niger, Mali…), and relied on external funding in a way that exceeded expectations (this is suspected on the part of regional parties).
As a result, it lost further national legitimacy and became a proxy force for foreign interests, which increased Sudanese resistance against it.
✅ 7. Failure to build an effective national coalition
Error: Rapid Support failed to build a broad coalition of political or tribal forces outside the circle of narrow interests, such as the importance of gaining support from local elites and tribal communities in areas of influence, which led to coordinated popular resistance.
The result: it remained politically isolated despite allegations of alliance with some civilians, while the army gained wider support over time, across all the different regions of Sudan.
✅ 8. Exhaustion in a long urban war
Mistake: Rapid Support entered a street war in Khartoum, Omdurman and Bahri, without having an exit strategy or effectively managing the areas.
Result: its forces were exhausted in a long-lasting confrontation, which affected its combat and logistical capacity, and allowed the army to carry out gradual withdrawal operations.
✅ 9. Weak internal coordination and lack of unified leadership on the ground
Error: Although Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) controlled higher command, coordination between RSF field units was weak.
As a result, disagreements recurred between field commanders and some offensive operations failed due to a lack of harmony in planning and implementation.
✅ 10. Failure to win in the media and diplomatic battle
Mistake: Rapid Support relied on military and personal stories (centered around Hemedti) without an effective media strategy aimed at international public opinion.
Result: he failed to obtain strong international support and remained in a defensive position in the face of the army’s media, political and diplomatic machine.
✅Conclusion
Despite the firepower and sudden outbreak of war by the Rapid Support Forces, the Rapid Support Forces made major strategic errors, represented by miscalculation of the final objective and political environment, the most important of which are:
– Error in calculating the numbers of the army commander, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan.
-Commit widespread violations against civilians.
-Failure to build long-term political and military alliances.
-The absence of vision for the post-war period.
These errors have led to the exhaustion of its field of action and the erosion of its legitimacy, making it difficult, if not impossible, to achieve its medium- or long-term objectives.
So we say goodbye
