Future scenarios for the policy of the siege pursued by rapid support, its partners and its impact on the Sudanese government and the negotiation route ✍️ Abu al -tayyib Adam Hassan Suleiman
Future scenarios for the siege policy pursued by rapid support, its partners, its impact on the Sudanese government and the negotiations.
We find that the Siege Policy Followed by “Rapid Support” from the first day of the war by destroying the infrastructure and looting of banks, companies, projects, factories, looting of citizens’ Property and Cities Siege, According to the Process of Systematic Pensions of the Sudanese Nation Capabilities and Neighboring Countries in Addition to the gradual and coordinated Economic Measures that contributes directly to the Sudanese Economy and Paralyze the government’s capacities and plans to deal with the crisis, therefore, the seat policy can be seen from several angles:
1. In the short term:
It can cause pressure on the transitional government by affecting vital supplies (fuel, food, communications, transport methods).
It can generate a state of popular and political exhaustion which leads certain parties to think of an urgent regulation to relieve suffering.
2. In the long term:
It is unlikely that the seat succeeds in obliging the government on negotiations, because such policies generally generate greater resistance and that the government is embarking on its position under the pretext of “national firmness”.
The continuation of the headquarters can lose popular, regional and international “rapid support”, especially if it is associated with the suffering of civilians or a humanitarian disaster.
3 future scenarios for blocking policy:
🔹 The first scenario: the continuation of the siege and its partial success
The situation:
Rapid support governs the control of food and food and fuel sources in sensitive areas.
Results:
The government faces an economic crisis and growing suffering.
The internal pressure of the street requires the end of the war by negotiation.
The international community interferes with human motivation to impose safe paths and urgent conversations.
Assessment:
This scenario brings the negotiations together, but on the conditions which are not imposed by rapid support, but rather in partnership with international mediators.
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🔹 The second scenario: the failure of the blockade and the government’s cohesion
The situation:
The government finds other ways to provide (through neighboring countries such as Egypt or Chad) and maintain regional and international support.
Results
The seat loses its effectiveness and is considered to be a “punishment for the people” more than a paper with political pressure.
The street turns against rapid support and accuses it of extending suffering.
Negotiations, if they occur, fast support sites will be very low, and you can barely see the naked eye.
Assessment:
This scenario weakens the headquarters to push the government to the concessions.
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🔹 The third scenario: the internationalization of the crisis by the siege
The situation:
The seat leads to a general famine or displacement which threatens the stability of neighboring countries.
Results:
The international community (the United Nations, the African Union, the Troika) interferes directly and presents the formula of “compulsory negotiation”.
Sudanese parties lose the freedom to formulate the agreement and are forced to accept external solutions.
The risk of rapid support is considered a “human disaster”, which can weaken its negotiation position.
Assessment:
This scenario opens the door to negotiation, but to the detriment of the independence of the national decision.
This last scenario is not possible, as the Sudanese government has exceeded, praise to God and its success, this stage.
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🔹 First: alternatives, options and strategies for the Sudanese government to thwart siege policies in the light of the three scenarios
1. Build alternatives to supplies through border ports with Egypt, Chad, Ethiopia and others to reduce the impact of the seat.
2. Effectively manage the humanitarian crisis to gain street confidence and not leave it vulnerable to counter-propaganda.
3. Activation of diplomatic channels with the African Union and the Arab League to confirm that the blockade targets civilians.
4. Preparation of conditional negotiations so that resilience is not understood as a complete rejection of the regulations.
5. Take quick strategies in the face of fast support and support maneuvers, which are as follows
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1. Quick support try to carefully manage the seat so that it is used as a pressure card on the government, and not as a punishment for the population (avoid targeting civilians directly).
2. He also tries to gain political legitimacy by declaring conditional preparation to negotiate instead of being satisfied with military pressure.
3. Quick support is trying to avoid the internationalization of the crisis as much as possible, because the international community can impose solutions that do not serve its interest.
4. He also tries to open the channels with civil forces inside or outside Sudan to obtain political coverage which reduces the image of the “revolutionary militia”.
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⚖️ Conclusion:
The Sudanese government needs a positive consistency with the preservation of the interaction of the Sudanese people with their armed forces in a trench in the highest degrees + diplomatic productive and supporting the strategic objectives to gain the battle of dignity.
