Haftar and the new Sudan accounts – the face of the truth – ✍️ Ibrahim Shaqlawi
The morning of the tenth June in June was not an ordinary day in the context of the Sudanese war that has lasted for more than two years, because it has followed a qualitative and dangerous development, with the general command of the Sudanese armed forces announced that the border points within the border triangle between Sudan, Egypt and Libya had been subjected to a joint attack launched by rapid support, From the generalities, General Khanan Haftar, in particular the “Salaf battalion” of his affiliate.
This event represents a qualitative change, which promises the possibility of the Sudanese conflict of the framework of internal war on the outskirts of regional internationalization, where interests, ambitions and influence are linked in a renewed scene.
The military support provided by Haftar forces to the rebellious militia-according to the “Sudan News” platform, was not limited to support in the field, but also included the transport of weapons and equipment via infidel, and the use of emiratic drones, as well as the surveillance of IL-76TD near operations. These indicators confirm that the attack was part of a broader plan, which was carefully prepared in regional decision-making centers supporting the militia, with the aim of re-drying the balance of the force on the ground, after having been enormous losses on the fronts of the Darfur du Nord, West Kordofan, White Nile and Khartoum.
The border triangle, which has become a square of confrontation, has always been a sensitive point of contact to which the calculations of Khartoum, Cairo and Tripoli intersect. Although the attack was carried out by rebellious Libyan and Sudanese hands, its history clearly indicate the role of regional actors, led by the government of Abu Dhabi, which has repeatedly accused the “international reports” of managing and activating the militia’s logistical and financial support network, from the south of Libya, after the supply lines coming from the mage last months.
In this context, the development of Chadi Laft emerged, represented in a congratulations telegram sent by President Mohamed Idris Deby to the Sudanese President, Lieutenant -General Abdel Fattah Al -Burhan, on the occasion of Aid Al -Adha. This telegram has important political connotations, because it is the first official communication between the two countries after months of apathy, in the context of the Sudanese charges of charity to accommodate elements of rapid support and neglecting the passage of military supplies through its territory.
This step can be read as a Chadian attempt to open a calm window, or as an indication of a gradual decrease in engaging in the conflict, driven by increasing security concerns linked to the extension of the Zaghawa tribe in the two countries, and by concerns concerning the extension of the fire of war inside Chadian, in particular in light of the flavor in military establishments, Western, and the modification of the bad humor towards war in Sudan.
This shaded decline, and if not officially announced, explains – according to observers – that it is an additional Abu Dhabi payment to seek logistics alternatives, and has found its loss in the axis of Haftar, which represents a geographically perfect political door, which continued to support the militia without exorbitant political costs, at least at present. Consequently, the Libyan change seems to be a real foundation of an alternative support line, which can exceed its capacity and its impact, the Chadian line down.
As for Egypt, present by the name and location of the Sudanese army data, it is found in front of a complex dilemma. Haftar’s forces, which led the attack, generally do not move without coordination with Cairo, but rather a strategic arm in eastern Libya. However, this attack coincided with the visit of the Egyptian president Abdel Fattah El -Sisi to Abu Dhabi, and in the light of discussions on the Emiratic Pressure linked to the Rafah and Gaza Crossing file, which raises whether this decision is a message of pressure that is not part of Egypt, declaring that “the South is flammable if the concessions are not transformed.”
And if these estimates are correct, the conflict exceeds that it is a conflict on the supply or influence lines, to become a struggle for the will in the same axis, between a country which is given to money (Emirates), and another guarantor of geography (Egypt), where the two parties realize that the continuous conflict of the agendas can lead to a possible explosion.
In this context, the next step remains open to a certain number of scenarios: the first, so that the Sudanese army continues to manage the situation firmly, because it began in the past few days thanks to the weather outings that have allowed strong losses to the militia and its two and its supporters.
Or that the new Libyan supply line is installed as a reality with which all parties deal with. Or perhaps the scene witnesses a direct Egyptian intervention to reduce Haftar’s movements in a way that guarantees Egyptian interests and does not embarrass its partnership with Sudan.
In addition, the intervention of other parties, such as Türkiye, is not excluded to organize the scene to serve its interests and programs in the region.
In the light of this complex scene, Khartoum seems to be a precious diplomatic opportunity, which should not be lost, by converting the shaded message into a security negotiation path which contributes to the closure of the Western front with Chad. This step would constitute an important change in the reduction of the chances of the expansion of the militia, in particular in the light of increasing military pressure on it in Darfur.
It is, according to what we see in the face of the truth, if Khartoum succeeds in containing the Chadian position and the activation of the diplomatic pressure tools of the regional parts supporting the rebellion, the road will be paved to isolate the militia of fast support regionally, and to open a new window on a possible understanding of the peace which has started to crystallize between Ankara and Doha in recent days. Tomorrow, God wants, we approach the effects of the Iranian war -Israeli against Sudan in the light of recent developments.
You are fine and well.
Saturday June 14, 2025 ad shglawi55@gmail.com
