Panorama (1) – Analyze information on the final battle of El Fasher, measure attack patterns and reveal trends in enemy intentions across different theaters of operations in Sudan ✍️ Brigadier General Ibrahim Aqil Madibo
*1/* By reading and analyzing the information circulating on the movements of the enemy, certain information from the sources, and by following the map of the bank of targets and strikes of the army, as well as the results of ground special operations, it becomes clear that the targeting system and priorities have been updated over the last period with many important qualitative developments that will either push the militia to the brink of the “abyss” and collapse, or are part of the process aimed at preventing the militia from moving and withdrawing its forces from the center and gathering and mobilizing them in El Fasher, by cutting the line of gradual, unorganized and uncalculated withdrawal of their forces, which was one of the repercussions of the active movement of our forces on the territory. axes of Al-Jazeera and Khartoum, and around the refinery and Jabal Muya, and in this context, there was a set of specific air operations in all areas of militia concentration in the capital and in the states , which express an approach based mainly on what can be called “warming the fronts”* and opening the way for simultaneous land operations in all areas, with the aim of neutralizing the mass of vehicles withdrawing from Khartoum and heading towards El Fasher, capturing the leaders and hitting the arms depots and weapons depots. militia concentrations in Nyala, Melit, Al-Sayyah and Al-Daein, starting with the process of targeting the enemy motive in the Hamrat al-Sheikh area towards the west, and another motive in the area of Jabal Awliya, through the bombings. the destruction of a mobile convoy in the communal area of Kudi and the simultaneous bombardment of Al-Kuma and Kabkabiya, an operation which took place recently yesterday. It is noteworthy that a new phase of military operations has begun in West Omdurman, Bahri and. The Khartoum sector, in addition to the information available on the active movements of militias, the movements of heavy military and civilian vehicles and the change of location of outposts in the areas of Bahri, east of the Nile, south of Khartoum, and Salama, and also by following their conversations in several clips in their groups about identifying meeting and meeting places in certain areas of North Kordofan and North Darfur, which clearly shows that there is a plan and an agreement for the militias to withdraw most of their troops. their forces came from Khartoum, Bahri and Al-Jazeera, and orders and directives were issued to round up everyone. The forces are heading towards El Fasher, and this analysis confirms the emergence of a new presence with an unusual density of groups from the southern state. Sudan is in the process of replacing and replacing some of its forces' positions and bases, leaving their positions in Khartoum and Bahri.
*2/* We believe that the objective of the enemy's recent movements is to achieve the following objectives:
*A-* Mobilize and gather their forces in areas near El Fasher and pose a major threat with the aim of overthrowing him.
*B-* Conduct pre-emptive operations to secure some towns in Darfur and Kordofan, and distribute supplies that have begun to arrive to their forces.
*C-* An attempt to attack an unexpected area designated by them and open a new combat front in one of the states.
*D-* Conceal these movements and the process of exit of their forces from Khartoum, Bahri and Al-Jazeera via the Jabal Awliya crossing by regularly recording Bahri's random artillery on Omdurman and Sabreen market as camouflage cover and by attracting attention. of our forces away from their withdrawal and exit routes. How much is recorded for this purpose on the routes west of Omdurman From the directions located southwest of Ras al-Shitan and the areas of Umbada, H. 20, this is done by infiltration and. passing through Nakhil and Mansoura, towards the areas of Karur, Omar al-Soul, the southern and eastern perimeters of the straw market and alleys 23 and 24 of Umbada, or from al-Salha on the street of the Christian cemetery, Waddalbilal Street, al-Nakhil, Shabab Karur and Lafat al-Buhaira Technical School Street, and from the second stop towards Libya Market, they bypass the last pump, Naivasha, then infiltrate west from Omdurman to through the farms.
*3/* A new entry of forces withdrawing from Khartoum and Al-Jazeera was observed in the areas of Hamrat Al-Sheikh, Wadi Al-Naim, Ghubaysh, Bara, Al-Jamamah and Al-Sayyah in the North -Kordofan, and Al-Koma, West Kabkabiya and Mellit in North Darfur.
*4/* We confirm that the final attack against El Fasher, according to the data, is not yet scheduled, but it will take on an increasingly intense character and will begin with heavy artillery bombardments with the use of suicide marches. The attack will advance from four main axes or directions in the form of three waves at short intervals with the intention of attrition of munitions, exhausting the defending forces, weakening the defenses, penetrating one side thereof, then unleashing the final attack. This explains why the Chadian army deployed part of its forces along its international border with Sudan in anticipation of the results of the Battle of El Fasher. This also explains the militia's attempt to open a new supply route from Libya via the El Fasher regions. Sayyah and the outskirts of the Madu Mountains*, and of course these developments will have direct repercussions, whether on the progress of the War of Dignity or on the political sector and the file of the talks and the results of Jeddah, as well as the Biden's electoral calls for a ceasefire and the provision of aid and his statements on El Fasher, or on the level of regional escalation of the current situation, in particular with the possible and expected reaction to the repercussions of the speech of the Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief. , Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, before the United Nations General Assembly, and the actions taken by China and Russia at the upcoming meetings of the United Nations and the Security Council.
*5/* For a deeper understanding of the dynamics and trends of the conflict in the region during the next stage in light of current developments, it is important to identify what can be called the “target bank » of the army for air and land units. , improve and activate it, and strike and destroy any movement heading towards El Fasher, given that the “militia” and its calculations towards El Fasher represent the most difficult link in this conflict, especially since all the movements adopted by the militia are based, in addition to the military and political situation, on their own tribal vengeance and considerations towards the armed movements and the popular resistance which supports them, fueled by their heavy losses in El Fasher , and on the understandings between the militias and between “progress” and the motivations and ambitions of the Emirates, *this tripartite coalition is the true face of the war waged against Sudan*, which exposes and exposes the objectives of the last stage and the militia's intentions to enter El Fasher, and attempts at control and escalation in certain areas of Sudan.
*6/* The resolution of the Battle of El Fasher requires careful planning that takes into account all factors likely to affect the conduct of operations, strict commitment and restriction to the plan developed by the executing agencies, all by providing a sufficient reserve of troops and combat supply equipment.
*7/* To complete the El Fasher security circle, *our forces must control and monitor the Al-Sayyah area northwest of El Fasher and the Medou Mountains near Al-Malha, approximately 50 km*. The Sayyah region and the Medou Mountains have the following advantages:
*A-* It is close to the Al-Zarq – Al-Malha road, and from there to Melit Al-Fasher, Al-Dabba or North Kordofan and Omdurman. If the militia takes control, they will control Al-. Malha and the mountains of Midoob also, and thus the whole area up to Kufra will be under their control. *This will be the main supply area for their forces and the area for them, the Hashd instead of Al-Zarq and Umm Al-. Cora.*
*B-* The Madu region is surrounded by a mountain range and has few outlets. It is similar to the areas under Al-Hilu control in South Kordofan, but it is more fortified and requires double the effort to clear it.
(Part two continues)…
Dean M/Ibrahim Aqeel Madibo
