Taqaddam Coordination: Who wins in the fight for awareness, interests and influence?! – The face of truth – ✍️ Ibrahim Shaqlawi
In this analysis, we try to reveal the strategies and scenarios that “Taqadum” has followed in the struggle for conscience, interests and influence since the outbreak of war in Sudan in mid-April 2023, by the militia of rapid support, as the finger continued to point the finger at the Forces of Freedom and Change parties as being “insolent” in their involvement in the inflammation, in particular some of their leaders continued to threaten in the event of a blockage of the political horizon. Al-Mahdi said in a statement to one of the channels that they would develop Their options in case the approval of the framework agreement or the signing of the constitution of lawyers, which some countries planned to impose on the Sudanese , were hampered. After the war, they shamelessly adopted the new name Civil Forces. The “Taqadum” coordination, according to observers, considered this move as an attempt to escape the whole scene of failure, a major and unprecedented failure in the management of the political process and the government, but Taqadum remained l one of the main Sudanese actors. political scene.
After 20 months of war, Taqadum continues to face major challenges in determining his path, raising many questions about his ability to remain an influential player in Sudanese politics, given his disappointment with the masses of the revolution and its obvious bias in favor of rapid support. The militia did not keep its slogans during the 2019 Sudanese revolution, which overthrew the Bashir regime, as it called for the dissolution of this militia, “the Janjaweed will be dissolved in addition to internal transformations”. situation which has once again seen the rise of Islamists, In addition to its dependence on regional and international interventions, all this increases the complexity of the political positions of this coordination. Which led him to try to balance the need to preserve his revolutionary entity and continue to agree with the militias with whom he signed the Declaration of Principles in Addis Ababa in February this year. Considering that these forces have become, in the eyes of Sudanese and international actors, out of the political and military scene after the terrible violations they committed.
The coordination tried to create among the Sudanese the mental image that it is working towards a peaceful transition to democracy. But over the years, he began to face increasing pressure over the principled and moral implementation of his slogans, as well as his attempts to come to power without an electoral mandate. Therefore, his alliance with the militias was one of the reasons that greatly diminished his credibility and allowed his opponents to prove his political opportunism.
These contradictions of positions have created a state of confusion within the coordination itself and in public opinion, because Taqadum sometimes seems to hesitate between emphasizing its revolutionary position on the one hand and accepting the reality of its military alliance with the militias which impose themselves on the other. ground on the other hand. This complex situation has led many observers to say that it could be the victim of internal political balances which force it to take unclear positions. As well as facing unprecedented pressure from regional and international parties seeking to reshape the Sudanese political map to serve their strategic interests in the country.
On the other hand, this international intervention raises questions about the capacity of the coordination to maintain its principles in the face of regional pressures, particularly with regard to the question of democracy and the preservation of Sudan's sovereignty. At a time when calls are multiplying within it to address the humanitarian crises and the situation linked to the war, the final declaration of “Taqaddum” was published yesterday, at the end of its meetings in the Ugandan city of Entebbe. This statement, according to observers, reflects. many of the divergences and contradictions that represent the complex political situation there.
The statement was not limited to analyzing the security and humanitarian situation in Sudan, but rather addressed political positions and possible options for the future. Although the statement discusses the effects of the devastating war in Sudan, it does not specify those directly responsible for the outbreak of this war, reflecting a reluctance to hold any party responsible for what is happening, given international condemnations of the rapid support militia as due to the brutal violations it commits in East Jazeera State, Darfur and Khartoum. This silence on responsibility may open the way to the interpretation that “Taqaddum” is trying to maintain its positions in favor of the militia or trying to satisfy the parties who finance its activities. The statement also suggests that outside parties are prolonging the war. , without these parts being directly identified. This ambiguity can be interpreted as an attempt by “Taqaddam” to balance maintaining its relations with international and regional powers and avoiding accusing the militias of making the situation worse.
The statement also emphasizes the need for a peaceful political solution, but according to observers, this paves the way for the idea of accepting a role for militias in political and security life. This is what the Sudanese reject. The statement also refers to the importance of international justice as a mechanism to deal with the situation in Sudan, which can be interpreted as a call for external interference in Sudanese affairs, which it continued to emphasize and even sought to coordinate with Britain in the Security Council. , where the “Russian veto” was overridden and foreign interference remained. It is rejected by the Sudanese people and government because it conflicts with the sovereignty of the country.
Although the press release emphasizes the protection of civilians, it does not directly refer to previous agreements with the militia, notably the document signed in Addis Ababa last February. The statement also included one of the most controversial points, namely the call for a weapons ban, which means equality between the Sudanese army and the militia. This point is understood as an attempt to neutralize the national army for the benefit of the militias. Based on all of the above, let's move on to reading future scenarios: to answer the question “Who is the winner in the struggle for “progress” between political consciousness, influence and interests?” Given the persistent political tensions and the active progression of military operations in which the army achieves visible victories, Taqaddam could adopt one of the following scenarios:
The first: an attempt to abandon support for the militias and flirt again with the leadership of the Sudanese army, and this can be presented as a commitment based on the withdrawal of the Declaration of Principles document that he signed with the militias. In this scenario, Taqaddam may need to formalize his efforts by introducing two regional mediators to ensure his presence in the political process. This is a difficult option, but at the same time could help it maintain its influence in the future. : Return to the revolutionary square and try to expand your alliance. This scenario also requires it to break its partnership with the militias in order to strengthen its position against the military forces and their supporters of the national parties, led by the party. The Islamists, whose confrontation will not be easy because they are banking on victory. A soldier who emulated him with his organizational ability to mobilize Sudanese youth to align with the army in the battle for dignity.
This option would further complicate the political situation and expose coordination to strong pressure from international parties seeking to impose political solutions consistent with their interests. Third: Internal disintegration. If the internal conflict continues to “progress” due to differences in positions between members, given the more moderate views that the Umma Party holds within the coordination, which may lead to its expulsion, this could lead to the disintegration of coordination. in a way that leads to a decline in its political influence. In this case, it could strengthen the dominance of national forces supporting the military on the political scene.
Therefore, depending on what we see in the face of reality, and in light of these intertwined scenarios, the central question remains: who is the winner in a struggle for “progress” between political consciousness, influence and interests? ? The answer to this question depends on how the coordination manages potential internal divisions and regional and international pressures on it, which may not help determine the shape of Sudan's political future, which is being shaped by the Sudanese people through their unprecedented policies. bias in favor of the military, prioritizing security over democracy.
May you stay well.
