Youssef Ezzat.. got up from his sleep and found a pile – beyond the news – ✍️ Muhammad Wadaa

*What was said in the recording of the first statement was contrary to the reality on the ground. The recording was prepared in advance and did not take into account any surprises*.

*Ezzat will be surprised by the recorded testimonies of senior officers seconded from the armed forces and retirees, who warned Hemedti against carrying out the coup*

*Indigenous and community administrations advised Hemedti not to risk confrontation with the armed forces*

*The list of nominations for political leaders has been revised to exceed 100,*

*Until April 14, Hemedti continued to buy loyalty and distribute money and vehicles*

*Hemedti's uncle Saleh Issa made a deal to withdraw forces from Marawi, but Hemedti thwarted it by sending more forces*

On April 12, 2023 AD, Rapid Support Militia forces arrived in Marawi City with 83 combat vehicles, a command vehicle and a fuel truck. They were stationed in the northern part of Marawi airport and at the air base, despite objections. the population, the division leadership asked the commander of these forces to return because he was violating the instructions of the General Staff not to move any military forces unless ordered to move, and the official spokesperson for the armed forces issued a statement. in which he says: “It is the duty of the armed forces, constitutionally and legally, to preserve and preserve the security and safety of the country, with the various agencies of the state assisting them in this matter, and the laws have regulated how to ensure this. Al-Aoun: Therefore, we must sound the alarm: our country is going through a historic and dangerous turning point, and its risks are increasing as the leadership of the Rapid Support Forces mobilizes its forces and opens up within of the capital and certain cities. the movements and openings took place without the approval of the leadership of the armed forces or simple coordination with it, which caused panic among citizens, exacerbating security risks and increasing tensions between the armed forces. The armed forces renewed their adherence to what had been agreed. to support the political transition in accordance with what was done in the framework agreement, and the political forces warn of the dangers of compromise on the positions of the national armed forces, which did not hesitate to achieve this by providing happiness. and cheap lives so that Sudan can enjoy security and stability),

On the same day (April 12), the Northern People's Committee issued a statement rejecting the presence of the Rapid Support Forces in Marawi. Crowds gathered and camped outside the airport, in the area separating militias from militias. forces of the 19th Division, Mr. Saleh Issa (uncle) arrived in Marawi Hemedti), crowds of citizens announced their rejection of any presence of the Rapid Support Forces in Marawi, under any pretext or justification whatsoever, stressing that Marawi is stable and safe. and there is no human trafficking, as the Rapid Support Forces claimed in their statement in response to the official spokesperson's statement, popular opinion is that the north does not is not a zone of war or tensions, and that. the presence of a rapid support force of this size means transferring chaos, chaos and security imbalance.

Hemedti's uncle, who is neither a soldier nor holding a position in the structure of these forces, claimed that he had come as a mediator to resolve the crisis, and Saleh informed a number of leaders of this civilians and commanders of the 19th division on April 14 at noon. (that Hemedti had agreed to completely withdraw his forces), and some of them listened to the voice of Hemedti (Espiker), and he confirms it at five o'clock in the evening, instead of withdrawing the existing forces, 40. Additional combat vehicles infiltrated the dirt road and joined these forces, which attacked the airport and air base from three directions at dawn on April 15. My uncle Hemedti Saleh Issa spent five days in Marawi to provide material and logistical support to these forces. Until they were defeated and the airport and air base liberated, Hemedti maneuvered for time and thwarted the first serious agreement to defuse the crisis by withdrawing his forces as he had pledged to do. TO DO.

By the end of April 14, the militia completed its deployment in Khartoum, beside or under the bridges and near the main weapons, and its armored vehicles arrived from Al-Zarq.

After Ezzat awoke from his sleep, he discovered (suddenly) that his forces had taken control of 90% of Khartoum, had occupied the general command, the airport, the radio and television, and that the states' military divisions and camps were occupied. falling one by one and that a number of army officers had joined the coup. A scenario that was supposed to go smoothly, according to what was indicated in the recording of the first statement, but the reality on the ground was not that. The recording was prepared in advance and did not take into account surprises, the first of which was the failure of the militias to arrest or kill the president of the Sovereignty Council and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and the firmness of the armed forces. the leaders, the public and main arms and the failed attempts to control them, and the airstrikes against the main militia camps, which Hemedti did not take into account, and the inability of Ezzat to disseminate the declaration no. 1),

Ezzat said in an interview with Al Jazeera Mubasher that the army betrayed them and a militia camp containing thousands of militiamen was attacked in Karary. According to his testimony, these were forces heading towards Yemen, and according to him, “Al-Burhan himself gave them the order to move. » Did Al-Burhan order militia forces to move towards Marawi? Did he sign an order to move armored vehicles from Zarqa to Khartoum?

Ezzat will be surprised by the recorded testimonies of senior officers assigned to the armed forces and retirees, according to whom they warned Hemedti against carrying out the coup (most of them withdrew and returned to their units), and the testimonies of civil administrations who advised Hemedti not to take risks. confrontation with the army. Ezzat is unaware or unaware that his coup was planned months ago and (completely rehearsed) several times, and the list of eliminations of political leaders, which exceeded 100, has been revised. Until April 14, Hemedti continued to buy loyalties. and distributes money and vehicles. Oh Ezzat, continue your sleep, we will continue.

June 12, 2024 AD





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